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Real and Monetary Policy Convergence: EMU Crisis to the CFA Zone
Abstract
A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria result  from regional 
monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this 
paper is to assess these disequilibria within the CEMAC, UEMOA and CFA zones. In the 
assessments,  monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, 
activity  and size while  real  sector  policy targets  economic  performance in  terms of GDP 
growth.  We also provide the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100% 
convergence. But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings for the most 
part support only unconditional convergence.  There is no form of convergence within the 
CEMAC zone. The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results have substantial 
policy implications.  Monetary and real  policies which are often homogenous for member 
states are thwarted  by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics which give 
rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore member 
states  should  work  towards  harmonizing  cross-country  differences  in  structural  and 
institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies.
JEL Classification: F15; F36; F42; O55; P52
Keywords:  CFA Zone; Currency Area; Convergence; Policy Coordination
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1. Introduction  
The European Monetary Union(EMU) crisis has sent a strong signal to other common 
currency regions on the goals of real and monetary policy convergence. A major lesson of the 
EMU  crisis  is  that  serious  disequilibria  result  from  regional  monetary  arrangements  not 
designed  to  be  robust  to  a  variety  of  shocks(Willet,  2010;  Willett  &  Srisorn,  2011).  In 
designing the euro zone, institutions’ almost exclusive concern was placed on limiting crises 
caused  by financial sectors. The official position of the German government today appears to 
remain that failure of these safeguards is the predominant cause of the crisis. This position can 
be reasonably argued for Greece, although its loss of competitiveness has also been a major 
cause for worry. 
In this paper we examine the nature  of real and monetary policy convergence within 
the CFA zone. The work contributes to the discussion of financial  integration in common 
currency  unions.  By  dissecting  elements  of  macroeconomic  and  monetary  policies  into 
financial  intermediary  dynamics  (of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size),  inflation  and 
economic performance, we provide an  in depth picture of real and monetary convergence 
analysis within the CEMAC, UEMOA and CFA zones. In a bid to provide more significant 
policy implications, we also calculate the speed of convergence and the time needed for full 
convergence. 
Beside the premise of the EMU crisis, the absence of studies that focus on financial 
convergence in the African continent constitute another motivation for this work. Although a 
number  of  papers  have  investigated  the  dynamic  co-movements  of  financial  markets 
worldwide, the emphasis has often been on developed markets  and the emerging economies 
of Latin America and Asia. According to Alagidede(2008), such neglect is far from surprising 
as  African  financial  markets  are  viewed   as  too  risky  and  less  developed  in  operating 
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institutional  environments.  Economic  instability  and  political  strife  have  plagued  many 
African countries and continue to pose a significant deterrent  to foreign investments and 
private  capital  flows(Kenyan  post  elections  crises  in  2007/2008,  Zimbabwe’s  economic 
meltdown,  Nigeria’s  marred  transition  in  2008,  the  unending  Egyptian  revolution  and 
resurfacing religious tensions in Nigeria). But for South Africa, no African country has yet  
risen as an emerging economic power. This might partly explain the relative lack of academic 
research  on  the  banking sector  of  the  continent.  However,  recently  Africa  has  witnessed 
significant  economic  and financial  developments.  This  provides  some basis  for  assessing 
multidimensional financial   convergence; especially in single currency areas amid pending 
EMU crisis.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following manner.  Section 2 outlines the 
motivations  for  assessing convergence  within  the CFA zone.  Section  3 presents  data  and 
discusses  the  methodology.  Empirical  analysis,  discussion  and  policy  implications  are 
covered by Section 4. Section  5 concludes. 
2. Motivations for  financial system convergence 
Financial and economic integration in the CFA zone is expected to provide gains in 
growth by favoring a  breeding atmosphere  for  competition  and efficiency in  the  banking 
sector. These gains emanate from price reductions in financial services leading to direct gains 
for  consumers  and  indirect  benefits  through  the  reduction  of  loaning  rate  that  favor 
investment(Weill,2009). Investigating  financial  intermediary  convergence  is  therefore 
relevant in the African continent. More so, financial integration and convergence are crucial 
in assessing the outcome of deregulation policies aimed at improving the performance and 
efficiency of the financial intermediary sector(Casu & Girardone, 2010).
Financial  theory  deems  integrated  markets  to  be  relatively  more  efficient  in 
comparison to divergent ones. An integrated financial intermediary market improves cross-
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border  flow  of  funds,  stimulates  trading  volume  which  in-turn  improves  stock  market 
liquidity.  Integrated banking markets provide investors with  the opportunity to efficiently 
allocate capital to economic operators(Chen et al., 2002).  The resulting effect is lower cost of 
capital  for firms and lower transaction costs for investors(Kim et al.,2005).  An integrated 
banking  market has the positive rewards to financial stability as it diminishes the probability 
of asymmetric shocks(Umutlu et al., 2010). Financial intermediation stability in-turn could 
mitigate  the  risk  of  cross-border  financial  contagion(Beine  et  al.,2010)  and  improve  the 
capacity of economies to absorb shocks(Yu et al., 2010).
The  financial  system exerts  a  significant  influence  on  modern  economic  literature 
debates(Scholtens & Naaborg, 2005). Firstly, the monetary policy transmission mechanism’s 
effectiveness is contingent on the financial system(Bondt,2000). Secondly, it is believed to 
impact channels via which financial development is linked to economic growth(Allen & Gale, 
2000). The financial  system interacts  with the economy by producing information ex-ante 
about possible investments, monitoring of investments, allocation of capital, facilitating trade, 
diversifying  and  managing  risks,  mobilizing  and  pooling  savings  as  well  as  easing  the 
exchange of goods and services(Levine, 2004). 
The need for convergence in the banking sector of the CFA zone draws on the tenets 
of arbitrage and the hypothesis proffered by the portfolio theory to devise a framework that 
inspires  convergence  in  financial  markets.  The  motivations  for  convergence  in  banking 
markets has premises on the literature of financial intermediary sector interdependence and 
portfolio diversification( Grubel,1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970). These papers have for the most 
part considered short-term links  of stock markets and have found the existence of short-term 
financial market co-movements. These results have been extended to cover co-variations of 
financial markets over the long-run(Bessler & Yang, 2003). Majority of these papers have 
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shown evidence  of  cointegration  as  well  as  short-term links  which  depict  some  form of 
convergence in financial  markets.
Dynamics  of  financial  intermediation  therefore  converge  to  reflect  the  level  of 
arbitrage activity. When they converge, it means there is a common force such as arbitrage 
activity that brings the markets together. This implies that convergence in markets will reduce 
the  potential  for  making  above  normal  profits  through  international  diversification(Von 
Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989). By the same token, if deterrents  or potential barriers generating 
country risks and exchange rate premiums are absent, the consequence is similar yields for 
financial  assets  of  similar  risk  and  liquidity  regardless  of  locality  and  nationality(Von 
Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).
Within the framework of this paper, real and monetary policy convergence implies the 
integration  of  banking sector  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and size;  as  well  as 
inflation and GDP growth. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We examine  a  sample  of  11  Central  and West  African  countries  with  data  from 
African  Development  Indicators(ADI)  and  the  Financial  Development  and  Structure 
Database(FDSD) of the World Bank. While openness, inflation,  population growth, public 
investment  and  GDP  growth   indicators  are  obtained  from  the  former  source,  financial 
intermediary dynamics are fetched from the later. Owing to constraints in data availability,  
dataset  spans  from 1981  to  2009.  More  information  on  summary  statistics(Appendix  1), 
correlation  analysis(Appendix  2),  variable  definitions(Appendix  3)  and  presentation  of 
countries(Appendix 4) is available in the appendices. Concurring with  Narayan et al.(2011) 
it  is unlikely to find convergence within a very heterogeneous set  of countries.  Thus,  we 
disaggregate  the  CFA  zone  into  two  homogenous  panels  based  on  regions(CEMAC and 
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UEMOA). The choice of variables is premised on two facts: (1) real economic sector policies 
are designed to achieve macroeconomic performance through growth in GDP; (2) monetary 
policies are designed to keep inflation in check and improve financial intermediary dynamics 
of  depth(money  supply  and  liquid  liabilities),  efficiency(at  banking  and financial  levels), 
activity(from banking and financial perspectives) and size. For clarity in presentation, selected 
variables are classified into the following strands. 
3.1.1 Financial variables 
a) Financial depth
Borrowing  from  recent  finance  literature(Asongu,  2011abcd)  and  the  FDSD,  we 
measure financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives with 
indicators  of  broad  money  supply  (M2/GDP)  and  financial  system  deposits  (Fdgdp) 
respectively. The former represents the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits 
while the later denotes liquid liabilities. The basis for distinguishing these aspects of financial 
depth is that  we are dealing exclusively with developing countries,  where-in a significant 
chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector(Asongu, 2011e). Both 
measures are in ratios of GDP(see Appendix 3) and can robustly cross-check one another as 
either account for over 89% of variability in the other(see Appendix 2). 
b) Financial efficiency
Financial intermediation efficiency here neither refers to the production efficiency of 
decision making units nor to the profitability-oriented concept in the banking industry. What 
this  paper  elicits  is  the  ability  of  banks  to  effectively  meet  their  fundamental  role  of 
transforming mobilized  deposits into credit  for economic operators.  We therefore employ 
proxies  for  banking-system-efficiency  and  financial-system-efficiency  (respectively  ‘bank 
credit  on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and  ‘financial  system credit  on financial  system deposits: 
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Fcfd’). Like with financial depth, these two intermediation efficiency proxies can cross-check 
each other as either represent more than 92% of variability in the other (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
In line with the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of “deposit  
bank assets” to the “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank 
assets: Dbacba). 
d) Financial activity
The concept of financial intermediary activity here highlights the ability of banks to 
grant  credit  to  economic  operators.   In  a  bid  for  robustness  we  proxy for  both  banking 
intermediary  activity  and financial  intermediary  activity  with  “private  domestic  credit  by 
deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: 
Pcrbof” respectively. The later measure cross-checks the former as it accounts for  more than 
99% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).
3.1.2  Other  variables
In  accordance  with  the  convergence  literature  we  also  measure  the  outcome  of 
monetary policy with inflation(Bruno et al.,2011), account for macro economic performance 
with GDP growth rate and control for openness, public investment and population growth in 
the regressions(Pritchett, 1997; Bruno et al.,2011; Narayan et al., 2011). In the literature on 
convergence of per capita incomes and the root of the convergence theory, the premise is that 
per capita incomes of countries identical in structural characteristics such as preferences in 
technologies,  rate  of  population  growth  and  government  policies  have  the  tendency  to 
converge to one another if the countries share similar fundamental characteristics(Prichett, 
1997). In determining these structural characteristics in our analysis, we proxy for preferences 
in technology,  population growth and government  policy with openness(trade),  population 
8
growth  rate  and  public  investment  respectively.  As  concerns  common  fundamental 
characteristics,  we  assume  countries  share  similar  monetary  and  real  policies  owing  to 
common central banks. 
3.2 Methodology
According to  Fung(2009;3) the two equations below are the standard approaches in 
the literature for investigating conditional convergence if  tiW ,  is taken as strictly exogenous. 
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln( εξηδβ τττ ++++=− −−−       (1)
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln( εξηδσ ττ ++++= −−                       (2)
 Where σ = 1+ β,  tiY ,  is the proxy for per capita financial  or real sector development in 
country  i at  period  t.   tiW ,  is  a  vector  of  determinants(openness,  public  investment  and 
population growth) of per capita finance(or real sector per capita),  iη  is a country specific 
effect,  tξ  is a time specific constant and  ti ,ε  an error term. In line with the neo-classical 
growth model,  a  statistically  significant  negative  coefficient  on  β  in  Eq.  (1)  means  that 
countries  relatively  close  to  their  steady  state  of  per  capita   growth  will  experience  a 
slowdown in growth of the per capita banking(real sector) development, known as conditional 
convergence(Narayan et al.,2011;2).  Borrowing from Fung(2009;3), if  10 << σ in Eq.(2), 
then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable around the path with a trend growth rate the same as that of 
tW , and with a height relative to the level of tW .  The variables contained in τ−tiW ,  and the 
individual effect iη  are measures of the long-term level  the market(real sector) is converging 
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to.  Thus,  the  country  specific  effect  iη  depicts  the  existence  of  other  determinants  of  a 
country’s steady state not captured by τ−tiW , .
Conditions for convergence elucidated above are contingent on the strict exogeneity of 
tiW , . Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because,  whereas openness, public 
investment  and  population  growth(components  of  tiW , )  influence  per  capita  financial(real 
sector)  development, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out. Thus we are confronted with the 
issue of endogeneity  where openness(trade), public investment and population growth are 
correlated  with  the  error  term( ti ,ε ).  More  so  country  and  time  specific  effects  could  be 
correlated with other variables in the model, which is often the case when lagged dependent 
variables are included in the equations.  A way of dealing with the problem of the correlation 
between the individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent variables involves getting rid 
of the individual effect by first differencing. Thus Eq. (2) becomes:
)()()ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,, ττττττ εεδσ −−−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi WWYYYY                  (3)
Even  with  this  individual  fixed  effect  elimination,  estimation  by  Ordinary  Least 
Square(OLS)  is  still  biased  because  there  remains  a  correlation  between  the  lagged 
endogenous independent variable and the disturbance term. Arellano & Bond(1991) proposed 
an  application  of  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments(GMM)  that  exploits  all  the 
orthogonality conditions  between the dependent  lagged variables  and the error term.  This 
GMM approach has been extensively used in the convergence literature and recently applied 
by Narayan et al.(2011). While Narayan et al.(2011) use Eq.(1) without fixed effects, this 
paper  applies Eq.(3) instead; as defined by Fung(2009). We prefer the  second-step GMM 
because  it  corrects  the  residuals  for  heteroscedasticity.  In  the  first-step  the  residuals  are 
considered to be homoscedastic. The hypothesis of no auto-correlation in residuals is crucial  
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as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the dependent variables. Also the 
estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the outcome variable and 
other explaining variables are valid instruments in the regression. When  the error terms of the 
level  equation  are  not  auto-correlated,  the  first-order  auto-correlation  of  the  differenced 
residuals should be significant  while their  second-order auto-correlation should not be the 
case. The validity of the instruments is investigated by virtue of the Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions  test(OIR). 
As emphasized by Islam (1995;14),  annual time spans are too short to be convenient 
for studying convergence, as short run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time 
spans. Therefore with respect to our data span of 28 years, we borrow from Narayan et al.
(2011) in using a 4 year non-overlapping interval such that we have seven time intervals:  
1982-1985; 1986-1989 and so on. This implies in the  analysis, the autoregressive order τ is 
set to 4.
We also compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating (σ/4) which by virtue 
of Eqs. (1) and (2) is the equivalent of the  Narayan et al.(2011) computation with  (1+β)/4. 
Thus  the  paper  divides  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  lagged  differenced  endogenous 
variable by 4 because we have used a four year non overlapping span in a bid to absorb short 
term disturbances.  When the  absolute  value  of  the estimated  autoregressive  coefficient  is 
greater than zero but less than one( 10 << σ ), we conclude the presence of convergence. A 
broader interpretation suggests, past differences have a less proportionate impact on future 
differences, meaning the variation on the left hand side of Eq.(3) is diminishing overtime as 
the country is converging to a stable state. 
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4. Empirical analysis
This  section   addresses  three  main  issues:  (1)  assessment  of  the  presence  of 
convergence ; (2) determination of the speed of convergence and; (3) computation of the time 
needed for  full(100%) convergence.  Table  1  presents  a  summary of  overall  findings  and 
addresses the first  two issues,  while  Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present  results  for 
unconditional and conditional convergence. 
Unconditional(absolute) convergence is estimated with only the lagged difference of 
the endogenous variable as  exogenous variable while conditional convergence is in respect of 
Eq.  (3).  Thus  unconditional  convergence  is  estimated  without  tiW , :  vector  of 
determinants(openness, public investment and population growth) of per capita finance(or real 
sector  per  capita).  To  investigate  the  validity  of  the  model  and  indeed  the  convergence 
hypothesis,  we  carry-out  two  tests,  namely  the  Sargan  test  which  examines  the  over-
identification restrictions, and the Arrellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which assesses 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan test investigates whether the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term in the estimated equation. Its null hypothesis is the stance 
that  the instruments  as a group  are  strictly  exogenous(do not suffer  from endogeneity),  
which is needed for the validity of the GMM estimates. We also report the Wald statistics for 
the joint significance of estimated coefficients. The autocorrelation, Sargan and Wald tests 
statistics with associated p-values for each of the panels are reported in the tables. The Sargan 
test statistics often appear with a p-value greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not 
rejected for the most part. We only report the AR(2) test in first difference because it is more 
important than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in levels. For most estimated models we are 
unable to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis  of no autocorrelation. There is therefore robust 
evidence that most of the models are free from autocorrelation at the 1% significance level. 
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4.1 Synthesis of results
In Table 1 , we provide a summary of our results. This summary results  is based on 
details  presented  in  Tables  2-3.  AC,  CC,  SAC,  SCC;  represent  Absolute  Convergence, 
Conditional  Convergence,  Speed  of  Absolute  Convergence  and  Speed  of  Conditional 
Convergence respectively. We notice that for the three panels, with respect to all dynamics 
only financial size within the CFA zone reflects a conditional convergence. There is no form 
of convergence within the CEMAC zone. The UEMOA and CFA zones both reflect absolute 
convergence in liquid liabilities, banking activity, financial activity and financial size. There 
is the absence of any form of convergence within any zone for inflation and GDP growth 
regressions. On a specific note,  we observe absolute convergence within the UEMOA(CFA 
zone) in money supply(banking and financial efficiency). 
Table 1: Summary of results on convergence 
Financial   Depth
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities 
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
CEMAC  Zone No No --- --- No No --- ---
UEMOA  Zone Yes(5%) No 7.87% --- Yes(10%) No 10.82% ---
Franc CFA Zone No No --- --- Yes(10%) No 7.5% ---
Financial Efficiency
Banking  System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
CEMAC  Zone No No --- --- No No --- ---
UEMOA  Zone No No --- --- No No --- ---
Franc CFA Zone Yes(1%) No 12.32% --- Yes(1%) No 14.72% ---
Financial   Activity
Banking System Activity Financial System Activity
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
CEMAC  Zone No No --- --- No No --- ---
UEMOA  Zone Yes(1%) No 11.02% --- Yes(1%) No 11.02% ---
Franc CFA Zone Yes(1%) No 12.67% --- Yes(1%) No 12.75% ---
Financial Size
AC CC SAC SCC
CEMAC  Zone No No --- ---
UEMOA  Zone Yes(5%) No 16.75% ---
Franc CFA Zone Yes(5%) Yes(1%) 7.2% 18.62%
Inflation and GDP Growth
Inflation(CPI) GDP  Growth
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
CEMAC  Zone No No --- --- No No --- ---
UEMOA  Zone No No --- --- No No --- ---
Franc CFA Zone No No ---- --- No No --- ---
AC:  Absolute  Convergence.  CC:  Conditional  Convergence.  SAC :  Speed  of  Absolute  Convergence.  SCC:  Speed of  Conditional 
Convergence.  CEMAC:  Economic  and  Monetary  Community  of  Central  African  States.  UEMOA:  Economic   and  Monetary  
Community of Western African States. CFA: Franc of African French Colonies. CPI: Consumer Price Index. 
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4.2 Results of absolute convergence
Table 2 below reports results of absolute convergence regressions. First and foremost, 
we notice that for all models, the instruments are valid as the null hypotheses of the AR(2) 
and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected. Where the lagged endogenous estimated coefficient is 
significant, the Wald statistics is also significant. We expected this result for the Wald statistic 
because only one endogenous regressor is used in the absolute convergence regressions. 
Table 2: Absolute convergence
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities Banking  Syst.  Efficiency Financial  Syst. Efficiency
CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA
Initial 0.356 0.315** 0.248 0.623 0.433* 0.30* -0.897 0.339 0.49*** 0.353 0.489 0.58***
(0.157) (0.035) (0.409) (0.342) (0.063) (0.09) (0.249) (0.254) (0.001) (0.369) (0.129) (0.000)
2nd Auto -0.900 0.140 -0.258 0.932 -0.915 -0.28 1.590 -0.364 0.647 0.064 0.078 0.180
(0.367) (0.888) (0.795) (0.351) (0.359) (0.77) (0.111) (0.715) (0.517) (0.948) (0.937) (0.857)
OIR 4.207 5.999 10.96 4.320 5.960 10.93 1.478 5.233 8.158 4.161 4.957 10.57
(0.998) (0.998) (0.947) (0.998) (0.999) (0.94) (1.000) (0.999) (0.990) (0.998) (0.999) (0.956)
Wald 1.998 4.40** 0.681 0.900 3.44* 2.78* 1.326 1.299 9.66*** 0.804 2.296 13.5***
(0.157) (0.035) (0.409) (0.342) (0.063) (0.09) (0.249) (0.254) (0.001) (0.369) (0.129) (0.000)
Countries 5 6 11 5 6 11 5 6 11 5 6 11
Obser 23 34 57 23 34 57 29 36 65 23 34 57
Financial  Activity Financial  Size
Banking Syst. Activity Financial Syst. Activity
CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA
Initial 0.043 0.44*** 0.50*** 0.040 0.44*** 0.51*** 0.203 0.670** 0.288**
(0.933) (0.001) (0.000) (0.937) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169) (0.012) (0.031)
2nd Auto 0.329 -0.687 0.180 0.272 -0.560 0.165 -1.078 -1.148 -1.127
(0.741) (0.491) (0.856) (0.785) (0.575) (0.868) (0.280) (0.250) (0.259)
OIR 3.611 5.628 10.84 3.488 5.651 10.844 4.798 5.946 10.999
(0.999) (0.999) (0.950) (0.999) (0.999) (0.950) (0.999) (0.999) (0.946)
Wald 0.006 10.2*** 35.1*** 0.006 11.1*** 37.0*** 1.889 6.210** 4.645**
(0.933) (0.001) (0.000) (0.937) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169) (0.012) (0.031)
Countries 5 6 11 5 6 6 5 6 11
Obser 23 34 57 23 34 57 26 36 62
Inflation and GDP Growth
Inflation(CPI) GDP Growth
CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA
Initial -0.317 -0.055 -0.215 -0.762 0.032 -0.081
(0.210) (0.922) (0.198) (0.330) (0.740) (0.563)
2nd Auto 0.163 -1.415 -0.571 0.162 -1.362 0.529
(0.870) (0.156) (0.567) (0.870) (0.173) (0.596)
OIR 4.015 5.953 10.636 4.095 4.156 8.956
(0.997) (0.980) (0.955) (0.994) (0.998) (0.983)
Wald 1.569 0.009 1.651 0.945 0.109 0.333
(0.210) (0.922) (0.198) (0.330) (0.740) (0.563)
Countries 5 6 11 5 6 11
Obser 17 18 35 16 23 39
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively .  CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA:  
Economic  and Monetary Community of Western African States. CFA: Franc of African French Colonies. Syst: System.  Initial: lagged autoregressive  
estimated coefficient.  2nd Auto: Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions Sargan Test. Wald: statistics for joint significance 
of estimates. Obser: Observations. CPI: Consumer Price Index.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
14
For financial depth, with respect to money supply  we notice convergence only within 
the UEMOA zone (at a 5% significance level) with a speed of 7.78% per annum(p.a). This 
implies that a 100% convergence will be achieved in about 51.41 years(yrs). With regard to 
the liquid liability dimension of financial depth, there is evidence of convergence within the 
UEMOA  and  CFA  zones  at  a  10%  significance  level,  with  speeds(time)  of(for  full) 
convergence: 10.82% p.a (36.96 yrs) and 7.5% p.a (53.33 yrs) respectively. 
Looking at results for financial efficiency, only those of the CFA zone are significant 
at  the  1% level  from both  banking and financial  system perspectives.  Banking(financial) 
system efficiency has a convergence rate of 12.32% (14.72%) p.a and a 100% convergence 
time of 32.46(27.17) years. 
We  also  notice  evidence  of  AC  in  banking(financial)  system  activity  within  the 
UEMOA and  CFA zones at a 1% significance level. For UEMOA, the speeds(time) of(for 
full)  convergence in banking and financial  system activity are(is)  equal at(in) 11.02% p.a 
(36.29 yrs). With regard to the CFA zone the speeds(time) of(for full) convergence in banking 
and  financial  system  activity  are  respectively  12.67%  p.a  (31.57yrs)  and  12.75%  p.a 
(31.37yrs). 
In the convergence analysis of financial size we also find evidence of AC within the 
UEMOA  and   CFA  zones  at  a  5  %  significance  level  with  speeds(time)  of(for  full) 
convergence: 16.75% p.a (23.88yrs) and 7.2% p.a (55.55yrs) respectively.
We find no support for convergence in inflation and GDP growth. The highest and 
lowest rates of AC are found in the financial  size analysis.  While the highest rate of AC 
convergence is within UEMOA (23.88yrs at a convergence rate of 16.75% p.a), the lowest 
rate is within the CFA zone(55.55 yrs at a convergence rate of 7.2% p.a). 
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4.3 Results of conditional convergence 
Table  3  below reports  results  of  conditional  convergence.  First  and  foremost,  we 
notice that but for the CFA zone(in financial system efficiency and financial size: with respect 
to AR(2) at a 10% level) in all models the instruments are valid at 5% and 1% significance 
levels  as the null  hypotheses  of the AR(2)  and Sargan OIR tests  are  not  rejected.  Of all  
combinations of panels with elements of real and monetary policy, we find the presence of 
conditional convergence only in financial size within the CFA zone with a speed of 18.62% 
p.a and a time for 100% convergence of  21.48 years. 
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Table 3: Conditional convergence
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities Banking  Syst.  Efficiency Financial  Syst. Efficiency
CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA
Initial 1.489 -0.324 -0.30 -1.024 -0.008 0.15 -1.179 0.034 0.22 -2.223 -0.676 0.163
(0.422) (0.780) (0.58) (0.743) (0.989) (0.51) (0.302) (0.914) (0.44) (0.448) (0.278) (0.50)
Intercept 0.091 0.018 -0.01 0.328 0.018 -0.01 -0.51* -0.070 -0.06 -0.385 -0.12** -0.06
(0.559) (0.735) (0.75) (0.816) (0.754) (0.56) (0.078) (0.189) (0.38) (0.571) (0.019) (0.15)
Trade 0.004 -0.006 -0.00 -0.007 -0.005 -0.00 -0.004 -0.0001 0.00 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0***
(0.553) (0.154) (0.17) (0.328) (0.383) (0.20) (0.352) (0.966) (0.63) (0.220) (0.493) (0.000)
Pub. Invt --- 0.04** 0.037 -0.017 0.037 0.04* -0.027 -0.039* -0.03* -0.021 -0.029 -0.03*
(0.039) (0.18) (0.758) (0.479) (0.06) (0.309) (0.063) (0.064) (0.581) (0.216) (0.071)
Popg --- 0.146 -0.07 -0.226 0.118 -0.21 -1.190 -0.044 -0.026 0.543 0.20** 0.091
(0.784) (0.78) (0.959) (0.816) (0.33) (0.210) (0.758) (0.779) (0.644) (0.015) (0.278)
2nd Auto -1.049 -1.004 -1.13 0.375 -1.384 -0.79 -0.277 -0.205 0.096 0.776 -0.668 -1.86*
(0.293) (0.315) (0.25) (0.707) (0.166) (0.42) (0.781) (0.837) (0.922) (0.437) (0.504) (0.061)
OIR 2.656 2.133 8.78 0.000 3.469 9.044 0.000 1.621 8.813 --- 0.375 8.10
(0.999) (1.000) (0.96) (1.000) (0.999) (0.95) (1.000) (1.000) (0.985) (1.000) (0.977)
Wald 19.7*** 26.3*** 3.89 13.7*** 6.946 19*** 43.5*** 14.5*** 8.440* 58.0*** 19.0*** 49.1***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.41) (0.008) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Countries 5 6 11 5 6 11 5 6 11 5 6 11
Obser 23 30 52 22 30 52 27 32 59 22 30 52
Financial  Activity Financial  Size
Banking Syst. Activity Financial Syst. Activity
CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA
Initial -0.315 -0.843 0.32 -2.749 -0.868 0.315 -0.348 1.316 0.745***
(0.829) (0.322) (0.10) (0.420) (0.318) (0.103) (0.835) (0.476) (0.003)
Intercept -0.038 -0.09** -0.05 0.632 -0.089** -0.063 0.026 0.053 0.009
(0.906) (0.031) (0.31) (0.758) (0.029) (0.22) (0.522) (0.259) (0.726)
Trade -0.007 -0.010 -0.0*** -0.009 -0.010 -0.0** 0.001 0.000 0.007**
(0.229) (0.100) (0.009) (0.153) (0.100) (0.021) (0.916) (0.851) (0.031)
Pub. Invt -0.022 0.017 0.018 -0.017 0.020 0.018 0.028 0.004 -0.005
(0.822) (0.721) (0.494) (0.850) (0.696) (0.498) (0.371) (0.766) (0.731)
Popg --- -0.259 -0.276 4.029 -0.279 -0.282 --- -0.039 -0.100
(0.646) (0.263) (0.711) (0.628) (0.262) (0.683) (0.319)
2nd Auto -0.286 -0.716 -0.157 -0.092 -0.700 -0.241 0.184 -1.626 -1.792*
(0.774) (0.473) (0.874) (0.926) (0.483) (0.80) (0.853) (0.103) (0.073)
OIR 2.972 1.783 8.618 0.000 1.722 8.617 2.143 4.177 9.847
(0.999) (1.000) (0.967) (1.000) (1.000) (0.96) (1.000) (0.998) (0.970)
Wald 10.7** 8.334* 11.88** 30.7*** 8.413* 11.1** 29.54*** 4.149 9.371*
(0.013) (0.080) (0.018) (0.000) (0.077) (0.024) (0.000) (0.386) (0.052)
Countries 5 6 11 5 6 11 5 6 11
Obser 22 30 52 22 30 52 24 32 56
Inflation and GDP Growth
Inflation(CPI) GDP Growth
CEMAC UEMOA CFA CEMAC UEMOA CFA
Initial -0.841 -0.357 -0.184 -0.456 0.207 0.008
(0.481) (0.722) (0.665) (0.482) (0.806) (0.986)
Intercept -1.679 -0.038 -0.182 -0.207 0.044 -0.048
(0.109) (0.938) (0.734) (0.415) (0.799) (0.604)
Trade -0.028 0.043 -0.001 0.035 0.046 0.025***
(0.596) (0.352) (0.721) (0.308) (0.246) (0.001)
Pub. Invt 0.387 -0.080 0.040 0.115 -0.035 0.033
(0.473) (0.731) (0.739) (0.654) (0.761) (0.182)
Popg -7.31* --- -0.662 --- --- 0.192
(0.087) (0.635) (0.572)
2nd Auto -0.668 -0.464 0.044 0.339 0.280 0.781
(0.503) (0.642) (0.964) (0.734) (0.779) (0.434)
OIR 0.000 3.379 7.862 1.830 1.467 3.840
(1.000) (0.971) (0.980) (0.999) (1.000) (0.999)
Wald 5.969 1.021 1.295 4.473 4.587 481.4***
(0.201) (0.796) (0.862) (0.214) (0.204) (0.000)
Countries 5 5 10 5 5 10
Obser 16 14 30 15 19 34
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively .  CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic  
and  Monetary  Community  of  Western  African  States.  CFA:  Franc  of  African  French  Colonies.  Syst:  System.   Initial:  lagged  autoregressive  estimated  
coefficient.  Pub. Invt: Public Investment. Popg: Population growth.  2nd Auto: Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions Sargan 
Test. Wald: statistics for joint significance of estimates. Obser: Observations. CPI: Consumer Price Index.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
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4.4 Discussion and policy implications
Before  we  delve  into  the  discussion  of  results,  it  is  important  at  the  outset  to 
understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and  conditional convergence in real 
and monetary policies  within the Franc CFA zone. The European Monetary Union(EMU) 
crisis has sent a strong signal to other common currency regions on the goals of real and 
monetary convergence. A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria result 
from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks(Willet,  
2010; Willett  & Srisorn, 2011).  In designing the euro zone,  institutions’  almost  exclusive 
concern was placed on limiting crises caused  by financial sectors. The official position of the 
German  government  today  appears  to  maintain  that  failure  of  these  safeguards  is  the 
predominant cause of the crisis. The present analysis has been based on two hypotheses: (1) 
real economic sector policies are designed to achieve macroeconomic performance through 
growth in GDP; (2) monetary policies are designed to keep inflation in check and improve 
financial intermediary dynamics of depth(money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency(at 
banking and financial levels), activity(from banking and financial perspectives) and size.
4.4.1 Absolute convergence
Absolute  convergence  is  the  result  from factors  such as  monetary  unions  and  the 
adoption of a single currency, among others(Nayaran et al., 2011). Absolute convergence in 
real and monetary policy implies countries share the same fundamental characteristics with 
respect to the financial intermediary market(or monetary policy) such that the only difference 
across countries is in initial levels of financial intermediary market development. In the CFA 
zone, the CEMAC and UEMOA regions that constitute it have distinct central banks which 
have independent monetary policies. This explains the large disparity in significance between 
their absolute and conditional convergence estimates. 
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Since  the  mid  1980s  countries  of  the  CFA Franc  zone have  undertaken  structural 
reform programs engineered by the International Monetary Fund(IMF)which include financial 
liberalization for the most part. The vested objective has been to reduce barriers to trade and 
increase foreign investment. Unlike other African countries without a single currency, CFA 
member states are expected to benefit more in the reforms by virtue of reduced risk and low 
cross-border currency conversion costs in the flows of trade and investment among member 
countries. Holding all other things constant(such as political instability, market isolation and 
macroeconomic  conditions),  financial  liberalization reduces barriers to trade and improves 
investment as it obviates the need for investor preference for one over the other. Owing to this 
financial liberalization, capital controls and control on exchange rate transactions have been 
substantially eased in the CFA zone; together with advances in computer and communication 
technologies  which  have  rendered  the  banking  industry  increasingly  synchronized.  This 
synchronization has also increased the speed of shock adjustment; implying the rate at which 
one bank in the monetary zone adjusts when there is a shock in the other has increased. All 
these factors have resulted in absolute convergence.
4.4.2 Conditional convergence
According to the economic growth literature(Barro,  1991), conditional convergence 
depicts convergence whereby one’s own long-term steady state(equilibrium) is contingent on 
the different structural characteristics or fundamentals of each economy or market(Nayaran et 
al.,2011).  Borrowing from Narayan et  al.(2011) still,  when financial  intermediary markets 
across countries differ in terms of factors relating to the performance of their markets, there 
could be conditional  convergence.  The convergence in dynamics  of the banking sector  is 
contingent  on  variables  which  we  observe  and  empirically  test.  Our  results  are  thus 
conditional on the  macroeconomic variables we have used. Note should be taken of the fact 
that, owing to constraints in data availability and degrees of freedom required for the OIR test, 
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we  conditioned  our  analysis  on  three  macroeconomic  variables  :  consistent  with  the 
convergence literature(Prichett,1997;  Bruno et  al.,2011;  Narayan et  al.,  2011). But for the 
case of financial  size within the CFA zone, our results  do not  find convergence in other 
dimensions of monetary and real policy for the UEMOA and CEMAC zones. It follows that 
small-sized financial intermediary countries within the CFA zone are catching up with the 
large  financial  sized  markets.  If  evidence  is   considered  based  on  both  absolute  and 
conditional convergence, then we find strong backing for convergence only in financial size 
within the CFA zone.  This broadly confirms the position of Benassy-Quere & Coupet(2005) 
that CEMAC and UEMOA countries do not share macroeconomic similarities and hence the 
CFA zone cannot be viewed as an optimal currency area. 
4.4.3 Policy implications 
In spite of homogenous monetary policies for countries in the CEMAC, UEMOA and 
CFA zones, we have only found strong evidence of some unconditional convergence. The 
absence  of  evidence  for  this  form  of  convergence(AC)  in  certain  dynamics  could  be 
understood from dissimilar initial conditions of financial development(among member states) 
and poor implementation of monetary policies(by member states). But for financial size in the 
CFA zone analysis, similar fundamental characteristics(policies)  in member states exhibited 
for unconditional convergence fail to play, in fine-tuning conditional convergence. It follows 
that despite homogenous fundamental conditions, structural characteristics  and institutional 
differences (including varying levels of democracy, political strife and quality of government) 
are playing a crucial role in deterring  convergence in  real and monetary policies.
As a policy implication monetary policies which are often homogenous for all member 
states are thwarted  by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics which give 
rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore member 
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states  should  work  towards  harmonizing  cross-country  differences  in  structural  and 
institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to assess convergence within the CFA zone. It is 
motivated by major lessons from the EMU crisis which suggest that the serious disequilibria 
among EMU member states has resulted from regional monetary arrangements not designed 
to be robust to a variety of shocks. In the investigations we have distinguished the CEMAC 
from the UEMOA region, before assessing their combined effect in the CFA zone. In the 
examinations we have assumed monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of 
depth, efficiency, activity and size, while real sector policy targets economic performance in 
terms of GDP growth.  We have also provided  the speed(time) of(for full) convergence. 
From the findings  we notice that for the three panels(with respect all dynamics) only 
financial  size within the CFA zone reflects  conditional  convergence.  There is  no form of 
convergence within the CEMAC zone. The UEMOA and CFA zones both reflect absolute 
convergence in liquid liabilities, banking activity, financial activity and financial size. There 
is absence of any form of convergence within any zone for inflation and GDP growth. On a 
specific note,  we observe absolute convergence within the UEMOA(CFA zone) for money 
supply( banking and financial efficiency). 
As a policy implication monetary policies which are often homogenous for all member 
states are thwarted  by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics which give 
rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore member 
states  should  work  towards  harmonizing  cross-country  differences  in  structural  and 
institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies.
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Appendices
  Appendix 1: Summary statistics 
Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations
Financial Depth Money Supply 0.205 0.074 0.047 0.433 79
Liquid Liabilities 0.133 0.067 0.029 0.315 79
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  Efficiency 1.192 0.565 0.417 3.671 87
Financial  Efficiency 1.144 0.443 0.412 2.338 79
Financial 
Activity 
Banking  Activity 0.149 0.087 0.026 0.405 79
Financial  Activity 0.149 0.086 0.026 0.405 79
Financial  Size Financial  Size 0.731 0.168 0.169 1.091 85
Other Variables Openness(Trade) 66.73 33.47 29.62 224.19 83
Inflation 3.791 4.808 -8.42 22.91 82
Public Investment 6.554 3.540 1.853 20.59 77
GDP growth 4.788 11.16 -15.71 71.18 86
Population  growth 2.855 0.734 1.740 6.398 88
S.D: Standard Deviation.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 
Fin.  Depth Fin. Efficiency Fin. Activity F. Size Other Variables
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Trade Infl. Pub. I GDPg Popg
1.000 0.893 0.053 -0.022 0.668 0.665 0.457 -0.033 -0.155 0.016 -0.389 -0.056 M2
1.000 -0.070 -0.127 0.714 0.710 0.545 0.073 -0.152 -0.002 -0.304 -0.016 Fdgdp
1.000 0.928 0.554 0.553 0.033 -0.167 0.165 -0.141 -0.090 0.083 BcBd
1.000 0.533 0.537 0.015 -0.142 0.203 -0.050 -0.056 0.280 FcFd
1.000 0.999 0.479 0.005 0.064 -0.060 -0.251 0.243 Pcrb
1.000 0.476 0.002 0.066 -0.062 -0.250 0.254 Pcrbof
1.000 0.151 0.086 0.112 0.007 -0.143 Dbacba
1.000 0.260 0.129 0.588 0.121 Trade
1.000 0.280 0.196 0.179 Infl.
1.000 -0.040 0.128 Pub.I
1.000 0.168 GDPg
1.000 Popg
M2 :Money Supply. Fdgdp : Liquid liabilities.  BcBd : Bank credit on Bank deposit.  FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposit.  
Prcb:Private domestic credit by deposit  banks. Prcbof: Private domestic  credit by deposit  banks and other financial institutions.  
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit bank assets plus central bank assets. Pub.I: Public Investment. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: 
Population growth. Fin: Financial. 
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   Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources
Inflation Infl. Consumer Prices (Annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Openness Trade Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank(WDI)
Public  Investment PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
 GDP Growth
Population Growth 
GDPg
Popg
Average annual GDP growth rate
Annual population growth rate
World Bank(WDI)
World Bank(WDI)
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply)
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits(% of GDP)
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
depth(Liquid liabilities)
Fdgdp Financial system deposits(% of GDP)  World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system 
allocation efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
allocation efficiency
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions(% of GDP)
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks assets 
plus deposit bank assets
World Bank(FDSD)
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits.  
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit  
bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure  
Database. 
Appendix 4: Presentation of countries 
Zones Definitions Countries Number
CEMAC Economic and 
Monetary 
Community  of 
Central African 
States
 
 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon.
5
UEMOA Economic and 
Monetary 
Community of West 
African States
 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali,  Niger, Senegal, 
Togo.
6
Franc CFA Franc of African 
French Colonies 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Mali,  Niger, Senegal, Togo.
11
23
References
Alagidede,  P.,(2008). “African  Stock  Market  Integration:  Implications  for  Portfolio 
Diversification  and  International  Risk  Sharing”,  Proceedings  of  the  African  Economic  
Conferences 2008. 
Allen, F., & Gale, D.,(2000). Comparing Financial Systems. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S., (1991). “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations”. The Review of Economic Studies, 58, 
pp. 277-297.
Asongu, S. A., (2011a). “Law, finance, economic growth and welfare: why does legal origin 
matter?”, MPRA No. 33868. 
Asongu, S. A., (2011b). “Law and finance in Africa”, MPRA No. 34080. 
Asongu, S. A., (2011c). “Finance and democracy in Africa”, MPRA No. 35500.
Asongu, S. A., (2011d). “Why do French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial 
efficiency”, MPRA No. 33950.
Asongu, S. A., (2011e). “New financial intermediary development indicators for developing 
countries”, MPRA  No. 30921. 
Barro, R. J., (1991). “Economic growth in a cross section of countries”, Quarterly Journal of  
Economics, 106, pp.407-443. 
Beine,  M.,  Cosma,  A.,  &  Vermeulen,  R.,(2010).“The  dark  side  of  global  integration: 
increasing tail dependence“, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, pp. 184-192. 
Benassy-Quere, A., & Coupet, M.(2005). “On the adequacy of monetary arrangements in the 
sub-Saharan Africa”, World Economy, 28(3), pp.349-373. 
24
Bessler,  D.A., & Yang, J.,  (2003).“The structure of interdependence in international  stock 
markets”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 22, pp.261-287.
Bondt, G., (2000). “Financial Structure and Monetary Transmission in Europe” . Cheltenham: 
Edward  Elgar. 
Brada, J. C., Kutan, A. M., & Zhou, S., (2005). “Real and monetary convergence between the 
European  Union’s  core  and  recent  member  countries:  A  rolling  cointegration  approach”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, pp.249-270. 
Bruno, G., De Bonis, R., & Silvestrini,  A., (2011).  “Do financial  systems converge? New 
evidence  from financial  assets  in  OECD countries”,  Journal  of  Comparative  Economics; 
Forthcoming.
Casu,  B.,  &  Girardone,  C.,(2010).  “Integration  and  efficiency  convergence  in  the  EU 
banking”, Omega, 38, pp.260-267. 
Chen,  G-M.,  Firth,  M.,  & Rui,  O.M.,(2002).“Stock market  linkages:  evidence  from Latin 
America”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26, pp.1113-1141.
Fung,  M.K.,  (2009).  “Financial  development  and  economic  growth:  convergence  or 
divergence?”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, pp.56-67.
Grubel,  H.,  (1968).  “Internationally  diversified  portfolio:  welfare  gains  in  capital  flows”, 
American Economic Review, 58, pp. 89-94.
Islam,  N.,(1995).  “Growth Empirics:  A Panel  Data Approach”,  The Quarterly  Journal  of  
Economics, 110, (4), pp. 1127-1170. 
Kim,  S.  J.,  Moshirian,  F.,  & Wu, E.,  (2005).  “Evolution  of  international  stock  and bond 
market  integration:  influence  of  the European Monetary Union”,  Journal  of  Banking and 
Finance, 30, pp. 1507-1534.
25
Levine,  R.,  (2004).  “Finance  and Growth:  Theory  and Evidence”.  NBER Working  Paper 
10766.
Levy,  H.,  & Sarnat,  M.,  (1970).  “International  diversification   of  investment  portfolios”, 
American Economic Review, 60, pp.668-675.
Narayan, P.K., Mishra, S., & Narayan, S., (2011). “Do market capitalization and stocks traded 
converge? New global evidence”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, pp.2771-2781. 
Prichett, L., (1997). “Divergence, big time”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, pp.3-17.
Scholtens,  B.,  &  Naaborg,  I.,(2005).  “Convergence  of  Financial  Intermediary  Activities 
within Europe: A comparison of banks’ balance sheets in the EU and the New E.U Member 
States”, Department of Finance, University of Groningen. 
Umutlu, M., Akdeniz, L., & Altag-Salih, A.,(2010).“The degree of financial liberalisation and 
aggregated stock-return volatility in emerging markets”,  Journal of  Banking and Finance, 
34(3), pp.509-521. 
Von Furstenberg, G.M., & Jeon, B.N.,(1989).“International stock price movements: links and 
messages”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp.125-179.  
Weill,  L.,(2009).  “Convergence  in  banking  efficiency  across  European  countries”, 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 19, pp.818-833. 
Willett, T. D., (2011). “Some Lessons for  Economists from the Financial Crisis”. In Indian 
Growth and Development Review, 3(2), pp.186-208. 
Willett, T. D., & Srisorn, N., (2011, June). “Some Lessons for Asia from the Euro Crisis”,  
The  Claremont  Colleges,  Workshop  on  Global  Growth  and  Economic  Governance 
Implications for Asia: George Mason University. 
Yu, I-W., Fung, K-P., & Tam, C-S.,(2010). “Assessing the financial  market integration in 
Asia-equity markets”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, pp.2874-2885.
26
